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will then be the optimal incentive scheme and ﬁxed wages become optimal
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Most economists claim that incentive contracts in ﬁrms are beneﬁcial as they
raise eﬃciency by increasing employees’ motivation to work harder. Indeed there
a r es o m er e c e n te m p i r i c a ls t u d i e ss h o w i n gf o rs i n g l eﬁrms that incentive contracts
have raised productivity signiﬁcantly.1
However, when looking on the frequency of occurrence of contracts based
on individual performance evidence is less overwhelming in favor of incentives.
Parent (2001) for instance surveys diﬀerent samples of the US working population
and from his summary statistics at most one quarter of all employees receives
some form of compensation based on individual performance.2
Indeed there seem to be very diﬀerent views in individual ﬁrms on whether
contracts based on individual performance are beneﬁcial or not. Some see incen-
tive contracts as an important component of their human resource management
practices whereas others take a much more sceptical view and may even consider
individual extrinsic incentives as harmful.
Psychologists have for quite some time also taken a much more sceptical view
on extrinsic incentives than most economists. Since the seminal work by Deci
(1971), it has often been pointed out that monetary incentives can be harmful
as they may reduce intrinsic motivation. Very roughly two strands of arguments
are given for this motivation crowding-out eﬀect.O nt h eo n eh a n d ,t h e r ei sc o g -
nitive evaluation theory, positing that individuals strive for competence and self-
determination and monetary rewards undermine self-determination and therefore
possibly the joy of performing the task. A diﬀerent explanation is given on the
basis of self-perception theories stating that individuals sometimes do not un-
derstand their own motives perfectly and — in the language of economics — learn
boundedly rational from their own actions on their motives (or preferences). If
monetary incentives are set for an activity, then an individual concludes that it
performs this activity because of those incentives. If the incentives are aban-
doned, motivation is reduced as compared to a situation where there never have
1Compare for instance Lazear (2000) and the overviews given by Gibbons (1997) or Pren-
dergast (1999).
2This number encompasses piece rates, commissions and bonusses. When excluding bonusses
the fraction drops to less than 10%. Compare also the summary statistics given in Parent and
MacLeod (1999).
2been extrinsic incentives.3
Numerous experimental studies have been conducted by psychologists on this
issue. On balance, the evidence is mixed whether extrinsic incentives are bene-
ﬁcial or whether they may reduce motivation.4 There are some recent economic
experiments trying to capture the situation described by principal-agent models
more closely. In laboratory experiments, Fehr and Gächter (2002) or Irlenbusch
and Sliwka (2003) have observed that the introduction of a possibility to set in-
centives5 made principals worse oﬀ and reduced eﬃciency as compared to a pure
ﬁxed wage setting. Interesting experiments with real eﬀorts have been conducted
by Gneezy and Rustichini (2000a), who ﬁnd that setting weak monetary incen-
tives may actually worsen results as compared to a pure ﬁx e dc o m p e n s a t i o nf o r
tasks such as answering questions taken from an IQ test or collecting for a charity.
In a diﬀerent paper, Gneezy and Rustichini (2000b) examined the introduction
of a ﬁne for parents when being late at picking up their children from day-care
centers. Surprisingly, the introduction led to a signiﬁcant increase in the number
of late-coming parents. Field evidence in line with motivation crowding-out is
found by Frey and Götte (1999), where a negative relationship between the time
spent for volunteer work and the fact that there is monetary compensation for it
is found with data from the Swiss Labor Force Survey.6
But how can this variety of standpoints and results observed be reconciled
with the economics of incentives? Recently this issue has been taken up by some
economists. Kreps (1997) for instance gives an informal discussion of the topic
and points out that understanding those issues involves activities unfamiliar to
economists but concludes that “messy or not, they are important and must be
pursued”.
Frey (1997) introduces a principal-agent model where he allows for the possi-
3The expression “motivation crowding-out” has been coined by economist Frey (1997). A
description of cognitive evaluation theory is for instance given by Deci and Porac (1978). Self-
perception approaches building on the work by Bem (1967) are described by Lepper and Greene
(1978).
4Frey and Jegen (2001) or Kunz and Pfaﬀ (2002) review the results of the psychological
experiments from an economic perspective.
5Incentives are set with a bonus or a ﬁne in Fehr and Gächter (2002) and with a piece rate
in Irlenbusch and Sliwka (2003).
6Related with this eﬀect but not concerned with eﬀort for a task is Frey and Oberholzer-
Gee (1997). In this study, questionaire data is analyzed indicating that people’s willingness to
accept that a nuclear waste disposal facility in their neighbourhood is lower when monetary
compensation is oﬀered for the acceptance.
3bility that an agent’s disutility of eﬀort is increasing in the monetary reward for
this eﬀort. Hence, he is able to show that principal-agent theory can in princi-
ple be adapted to encompass the reduction of intrinsic motivation by monetary
rewards. However, the crowding-out eﬀect, i.e. the reason for the positive rela-
tionship between disutility of eﬀort and rewards, is not shown endogenously in
the model. This is of course legitimate as one can refer to psychological results
and theories to justify such an assumption and analyze its eﬀects in a standard
framework. However, it seems also interesting to consider whether an explana-
tion for motivation crowding-out can be given endogenously within the economic
model. In this paper we want to follow the latter approach.
To do this we extend a simple standard principal-agent model in two steps.
As a ﬁrst step, we introduce the possibility that a certain fraction of agents in
the population is reliable, i.e. such agents stick to agreements they signed even if
the fulﬁllment is not veriﬁable.7 If this is the case, a contract consists — besides
the payment scheme — also of a performance objective specifying the eﬀort level
the agent should choose. In contrast to a “homo oeconomicus”, a reliable agent
sticks to such an agreement once he has signed the contract.
We derive optimal incentive contracts for this case. If performance measure-
ment is costly, we show that incentive contracts are optimal if and only if the
fraction of reliable agents is suﬃciently small and otherwise ﬁxed wage contracts
are chosen. Furthermore, as long as the fraction of reliable agents is positive,
optimal incentive contracts are lower powered than standard theory predicts. In
this view, the purpose of incentive contracts is to insure the principal against
contracting with unreliable agents. Incentive contracts are completely useless if
all agents are reliable as they then only impose wasteful cost for risk premia and
performance measurement.
In a second step, we consider the importance of social norms in the following
way: We depart from the idea that the “moral convictions” of all agents, i.e. their
attitude on sticking to agreements, are ﬁxed in advance. Instead we assume that
at h i r dg r o u po fa g e n t se x i s t s ,w h od on o tf a l ly e ti n t oo n eo ft h ec a t e g o r i e so f
being either reliable or unreliable but are inﬂuenced in their moral convictions by
what they think others will do. We assume that those “conformists” are reliable
7Koford and Penno (1992) dicuss the possibility of contracting with ethical agents who do
not cheat from an accounting perspective. They show for instance that the installation of
internal control systems becomes less proﬁtable if the proportion of ethical agents rises.
4if the social norm “requires” to be reliable. More precisely, a confomist will be
reliable if and only if she or he thinks that a suﬃciently high fraction of the other
“ s t e a d f a s t ”a g e n t si sr e l i a b l ea sw e l l .T h eg a m ew et h e na n a l y z ei st h e r e f o r ei n
av e r ys i m p l ew a yapsychological game as deﬁned by Geanakoplos et al. (1989),
where players’ payoﬀsm a yn o to n l yb ea ﬀected by what they do but also by what
they believe.
Typically, in reality there will be some uncertainty on the prevalence of a social
norm. Translated to our model, the fraction of reliable agents in the population
will not perfectly known by an individual agent. The principal as the employer,
however, is supposed to have superior information on the prevalent norm in form
of a more precise signal about the fraction of reliable agents for instance as she
h a se x p e r i e n c e dt h eb e h a v i o ro fp r e v i o u se m p l o y e e s .
If now the principal chooses the compensation scheme based on this superior
information, the agents learn something on the principal’s beliefs about the pre-
vailing norm. In particular, an agent may conclude from being oﬀered a high
powered incentive scheme that the principal thinks that the fraction of reliable
agents is small: Otherwise, she would not have chosen the costly incentive con-
tract. But in that case, the agent learns that not sticking to agreements is a
widespread and therefore acceptable behavior. Hence, a conformist who is inﬂu-
enced by this information may become unreliable after being oﬀered an incentive
contract whereas the same agent might have stayed reliable with a pure ﬁxed
wage. As we will show, given any optimal contract a reliable agent always exerts
ah i g h e re ﬀort than an unreliable agent. Hence, incentive contracts may indeed
reduce the motivation of agents. A principal who does not take that into account
ignores those ‘hidden costs of incentive contracts’ and may actually be worse oﬀ.
A rational principal will of course take these indirect consequences into ac-
count. She has to trade oﬀ two eﬀects when designing optimal compensation
schemes. On the one hand, there is the well known incentive eﬀect: Higher pow-
ered incentives lead to higher eﬀort levels of unreliable agents. But on the other
hand, a crowding-out eﬀect may arise as the choice of high powered incentives
may signal that not being reliable is a widespread and acceptable demeanor,
which may undermine the reliability of others. It is then of course interesting
to know whether she will still choose incentive contracts or prefer a ﬁxed wage
to avoid motivation crowding-out. We will therefore analyze the circumstances
5under which the latter eﬀect outweighs the former and will characterize equilibria
of the game arising.
Ad i ﬀerent approach to explain motivation crowding-out has very recently
been taken by Bénabou and Tirole (2002), who formalize aspects of psychological
self-perception approaches. A key assumption in their principal-agent model is
that an agent does not know perfectly whether he likes or dislikes a task he has
to fulﬁll. But the principal has more accurate information on whether the task is
attractive for the agent in the end. Motivation crowding-out takes place in their
model, as the agent infers from being oﬀered a high powered incentive scheme
that the principal thinks that he will dislike the task, which in turn reduces his
own beliefs on the attractiveness of the task. A diﬀerence between our approach
and Bénabou and Tirole’s as well as the mentioned psychological explanations for
motivation crowding-out is that a necessary precondition for those explanations
is that an agent likes performing the task with positive probability, whereas
our approach can explain motivation crowding-out also in those circumstances
typically analyzed in principal-agent models where an agent always dislikes higher
eﬀorts.8
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the simple principal-agent
model. In Section 3 optimal compensation schemes are analyzed in this model.
Conformist agents who are inﬂuenced by social norms are introduced in Section
4 and the consequences for optimal contract oﬀers are analyzed in this section.
Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2 A Simple Model
Our model simply extends a standard Holmström/Milgrom or LEN-type linear
principal-agent model with normally distributed noise used in numerous applica-
tions9 to encompass the possibility of contracting with reliable agents. A principal
P employs an agent A to perform a certain task. The agent can exert an eﬀort
8Note that the experiments by Fehr and Gächter (2002) and Irlenbusch and Sliwka (2003)
mentioned above have found that incentives reduced motivation in situations where the agents
unambiguously disliked higher eﬀort as higher eﬀort simply was represented by a higher mon-
etary expenditure by the agent.
9Compare Holmström and Milgrom (1990), Holmström and Milgrom (1991), Gibbons and
Murphy (1992), Holmström and Milgrom (1994) or in accounting for instance Feltham and Xie
(1994), Datar et al. (2001) and many more. For an overview see also Prendergast (1999).
6level e at costs c(e) where c(e)=c
2e2.T h e e ﬀort level e is unveriﬁable. In a
ﬁrst step, we assume that there are two types of agents, reliable and unreliable
ones. The agent’s type is denoted by θ.I fθ = θR the agent is reliable, if θ = θU
he is unreliable. All agents maximize their individual utility but reliable agents
stick to promises or agreements they made. One can think of this in the following
simple way: Once a reliable agent has promised to choose a certain action he feels
guilty when not fulﬁlling this promise and will receive an extremely large utility
loss from having a bad conscience such that it is always in his best interest to
stick to the promise. The principal does not know whether the agent is reliable
or unreliable but she has a prior belief that the agent is reliable with probability
φ. In Section 4 we will generalize this to encompass the possibility that agents
can still be inﬂuenced in their moral convictions.
The principal’s revenue from the agent’s task simply corresponds to the agents
eﬀort level e.T h i s p a y o ﬀ is itself unveriﬁable. In contrast to standard hidden
action models we assume that performance measurement is costly: At a given
cost k the principal can install a technology yielding a veriﬁable performance
signal x. This assumption should capture the fact that typically in practice the
installation of a performance measurement system and the payout of variable
wage components come at a cost for the company. The performance signal x is
given by
x = e + ε,
where ε is a normally distributed random variable with mean 0 and variance
σ2. If the principal decided to set up an incentive system, she can oﬀer a linear
compensation scheme consisting of a ﬁxed wage α and a variable rate β such that
the agent receives a total wage of
α + β (e + ε)
when choosing an eﬀort level of e. But note that the principal has an additional
contractual instrument: She can specify a requested eﬀort level or performance
commitment in the contract, which we denote by ˆ e. Once a reliable agent has
signed such a contract he will honor this performance commitment and choose
e =ˆ e even though the eﬀort level is unveriﬁable. We can denote any such contract
by a vector C =( ˆ e,α,β).
7If the principal decides against such an incentive system, she saves the costs
of performance measurement k and contracts simply consist of a ﬁxed wage α
and a requested eﬀort level of ˆ e.
We assume that the principal can only propose a single contract at a time
and therefore cannot screen the agents.10 The principal is risk neutral and the
agent is risk averse with constant absolute risk aversion. An unreliable agent’s
utility function when receiving a wage payment w and choosing e is given by
−exp(−r(w − c(e))),
where r is the agent’s rate of absolute risk aversion. The utility function of the
reliable agent additionally depends on an agreed eﬀort ˆ e.I fe =ˆ e he has the same
utility function as an unreliable agent. If e 6=ˆ e his utility is minus inﬁnity.11 All
agents have a reservation wage of 0.
3 Optimal Compensation Schemes
We start by analyzing the optimal compensation when the principal selects a
pure ﬁxed wage given that she knows that the agent is reliable with probability
φ. Then we proceed by investigating optimal incentive schemes for that case,
compare both types of compensation and discuss their relative advantages.
3.1 Fixed Wage Contracts
If the principal intends to set a ﬁxed wage, a contract oﬀer is simply C =( ˆ e,α,0).
An unreliable agent will then of course never exert any eﬀort even if he accepted
the contract. A reliable agent will accept t h ec o n t r a c ti fi ti si nh i sb e s ti n t e r e s t ,
i.e. if his participation constraint
α − c(ˆ e) ≥ 0
10See Alger and Renault (2000) for a paper where optimal screening is analyzed in an adverse
selection framework without hidden actions in which some agents are honest.
11The preferences are therefore lexicographic: The utility of any bundle (e, ˆ e,w) where e 6=ˆ e
is lower than the utility of any bundle (e, ˆ e,w) with e =ˆ e.
8is met and will afterwards always choose ˆ e. This participation constraint will
always be binding as the principal could otherwise reduce α and would be strictly
better oﬀ. Therefore, the wage will compensate for the reliable agents’ eﬀort costs




φˆ e − c(ˆ e).
The optimal requested eﬀort level is deﬁned by φ = c0 (ˆ e). Hence, as costs are
q u a d r a t i cw eg e tt h a tˆ e = φ/c and the optimal wage payment is α = φ
2/2c,w h i c h
gives us the following simple result for the optimal ﬁxed wage contract denoted
by C∗
F (φ):
Proposition 1 The optimal contract C∗
F (φ)=( ˆ e,α,0) in a pure ﬁxed wage














Note that an unreliable agent earns a rent of size α. The principal will oﬀer a
positive wage level as long as φ>0 as she earns strictly positive proﬁts from the
reliable agents. The higher the eﬀort ˆ e the principal requires from the reliable
agents the higher has to be the wage to compensate them for their costs of eﬀort.
But the larger will also be the loss when the agent turns out to be unreliable. The
larger is the fraction of reliable agents in the population, the larger the expected
return for a given wage payment. Hence, the wages and the requested eﬀort levels
increase with the fraction φ of reliable agents.
If all agents are reliable (i.e. φ =1 )t h eﬁrst-best solution is attained as a
contract is chosen where the marginal costs of the requested eﬀort are equal to
the marginal return to the principal which is equal to 1. The principal’s ﬁrst-best
proﬁt is therefore 1/2c.
A huge and steadily growing experimental literature12 has examined such “gift
exchange” settings based on Akerlof’s (1982) fair wage-eﬀort hypothesis in which
ap l a y e ri nt h er o l eo fap r i n c i p a lc a no ﬀer a wage w to another player in the role of
an agent, who in turn can choose an eﬀort level e which is costly for the agent but
beneﬁcial for the principal.13 Whereas standard theory (i.e. φ =0in our model)
12Compare for instance Fehr et al. (1993), Berg et al. (1995), Fehr et al. (1997) or for a recent
overview Fehr and Schmidt (2002).
13In those experiments the agent typically chooses a number representing his eﬀort level. The
higher the number, the higher are the proﬁts for the principal but also the costs for the agent.
9predicts that w = e =0in that case, in many experiments it has been shown that
players typically choose positive wages and eﬀort levels. Moreover, on average the
eﬀort exerted by an agent increased in the size of the wage he received. Mainly,
this has been attributed to preferences for reciprocity or inequity aversion of the
players.14 Although we do not doubt that reciprocity and inequity aversion play
an important role, this model yields a diﬀerent simple possible explanation for
the monotonic relationship of eﬀorts and wages: High requested eﬀort levels go
a l o n gw i t hh i g hw a g eo ﬀers and reliable agents will then indeed respond with
high eﬀort levels. Indeed, most of the studies examine situations as considered
here, where the principal proposes a wage in connection with a requested eﬀort
level before the agent chooses his actual eﬀort, although for theories of inequity
aversion and reciprocity this eﬀort request is neither necessary nor should have
any impact on the outcome.
3.2 Incentive Contracts
Once the principal has chosen to set up a performance measurement system at
costs k she can propose a performance contingent incentive contract and therefore
has one additional instrument to steer the agent’s actions. Suppose the principal
oﬀers a contract C =( ˆ e,α,β) with a positive value of β. If the agent is reliable, he
will always choose ˆ e after having accepted the contract. But we now have to take
i n t oa c c o u n tt h a te v e nt h o u g hβ does not aﬀect this reliable agent’s motivation
it is of course of importance for his expected utility from accepting the contract:
On the one hand, he receives an additional share of the proﬁts. On the other
hand, his income will become risky as the performance measure is noisy. Again,
the contract must yield at least as much utility as his reservation wage 0. Hence,
a reliable agent will accept the contract and choose ˆ e if









2 ≥ 0. (1)
Note that the same contract will always be accepted by an unreliable agent if the
inequality is met: He is at least weakly better oﬀ t h a nt h er e l i a b l ea g e n ta sh em a y
14Reciprocity has been formally modelled by Rabin (1993), Falk and Fischbacher (1999) or
Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (1999), inequity aversion by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton
and Ockenfels (2000). A more general approach integrating both forms of social preferences is
introduced by Charness and Rabin (2002).
10always choose ˆ e as well. Hence, there is no contract oﬀer that is accepted only
by reliable agents. Any contract satisfying (1) will be accepted by the unreliable
agent and the latter will afterwards choose e by simply maximizing his utility.
The ﬁrst order condition of his objective function yields
β − c




as costs are quadratic. Note that the principal is of course at least weakly better
oﬀ when contracting with a reliable agent as she can always set ˆ e = β/c. Hence,
she clearly always wants that reliable agents accept the contract. But as we have
seen, she cannot prevent unreliable agents from accepting.
We now denote by e the incentive compatible eﬀort level chosen by the unre-
liable agents in contrast to the eﬀort level ˆ e chosen by the reliable agents. The
principal’s expected payoﬀ when oﬀering an incentive contract (α,β, ˆ e) is then
given by
(1 − β)[φˆ e +( 1− φ)e] − α − k.
The optimal contract choice amounts to the maximization of the principal’s ex-
pected payoﬀ subject to the incentive constraint of the unreliable agent (2) and




(1 − β)[φˆ e +( 1− φ)e] − α − k










β − ce =0
As in standard hidden action problems with transferable utility and unlimited
liability the participation constraint will be binding as otherwise the ﬁxed wage
α could be reduced. Hence, we can solve the binding condition (1) for α and
substitute this in the principal’s objective function. By solving the program we
obtain the following result for the optimal incentive contract denoted by C∗
V (φ):
Proposition 2 The optimal incentive contract C∗
V (φ)=( ˆ e,α,β) has the follow-






The smaller the fraction of reliable agents the higher powered is the incentive
















Note that for φ =0the solution is exactly the standard second best solution
in the linear contracts model. The higher the fraction of reliable agents, the lower
powered is the incentive scheme. For φ =1t h ev a r i a b l er a t eβ is zero and the
contract is a pure ﬁxed wage contract.
A direct and important implication is that incentive contracts are completely
unnecessary if all agents are reliable. If that is the case, choosing an incentive
contract only imposes a wasteful risk on the risk averse agent and the principal
has to bear the direct costs of measuring performance. However, the higher the
danger of contracting with an unreliable agent, the higher powered the incentive
scheme.
Hence, in the spirit of our model, the function of an incentive contract is to
insure the principal against the risk of contracting with unreliable agents.T h e
principal chooses higher powered incentive schemes only if she fears that the work
ethics of her employees is bad.
In this sense, the simple model captures the notion of ‘moral hazard’ in a
more general way than standard agency theory does. The term ‘moral hazard’
originated as the “risk to an insurance company resulting from uncertainty about
the honesty of the insured”15. But in standard moral hazard models there is no
uncertainty about the honesty of agents, as they are always dishonest. Our model
15Compare The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language: Fourth Edition.
2000.
12indicates that those models predict too high powered incentives if there is indeed
some uncertainty about the honesty of agents.
3.3 Fixed Wages or Pay-for-Performance?
Now we compare both contract types. The key question is whether the principal
wants to set up a costly performance measurement system. As we have seen, she
will never need to set-up an incentive system if all agents are reliable (i.e. φ =1 ).
In that case, the ﬁrst best is attained by a simple ﬁxed wage contract. On the
other hand, if all agents are unreliable (φ =0 ), we are back in the standard second
best world: The principal cannot attain a positive payoﬀ without a performance
contingent contract.
It is useful to introduce some additional notation. We denote by C∗ (φ) the
optimal (ﬁxed wage or incentive) contract given that the probability of meeting
a reliable agent is φ. The principal’s proﬁt for a given contract C and probability
φ is denoted by π(C|φ).W en o wc o m p a r et h ep r o ﬁts in both systems and obtain
the following result:
Proposition 3 The principal will choose an incentive contract if and only if the
fraction of reliable agents is smaller than a cut-oﬀ value ˆ φ and otherwise a ﬁxed







2c if φ ≥ ˆ φ,
1
2c − (1−φ2)rσ2
2(1−φ2+crσ2) − k otherwise.
(3)
The cut-oﬀ value ˆ φ is decreasing in the agents’ risk aversion r, the variance of
the performance measure σ2 and the costs of the incentive scheme k.T h ep r o ﬁt
function is strictly increasing in the proportion of reliable agents φ.
Proof: See Appendix.
With a pure ﬁx e dw a g ea sw e l la sw i t ha ni n c e n t i v es c h e m e ,t h ep r o ﬁt function
is strictly increasing in the fraction of reliable agents φ. Hence, the same holds for
the composite function. An example for the proﬁtf u n c t i o ni sp l o t t e di nF i g u r e1 .
For values of φ smaller than the cut-oﬀ ˆ φ it is determined by the proﬁts with an
optimal incentive scheme. For values larger than ˆ φ the principal will set a ﬁxed
13wage. When φ =1 ,t h eﬁrst-best solution is attained with a ﬁxed wage. The
value of the proﬁt function at φ =0is just determined by the principal’s proﬁt
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Figure 1: The principal’s proﬁt as a function of the fraction of honest agents φ.
4 Contracts Signal Social Norms
So far we have assumed, that it is clear for an agent from the outset that he is
either reliable or unreliable. One may think of this as a situation where there
is the social norm: “you have to stick to your word” and some agents adhere to
this norm while others ignore promises and seek to maximize individual mone-
tary payoﬀs. Social psychologists deﬁne social norms as people’s beliefs about
the attitudes and behaviors that are normal or acceptable in a particular social
context. In many situations, people’s perception of these norms will greatly in-
ﬂuence their behavior. Hence, when it is a question of social norms whether it is
acceptable to be unreliable, the behavior of people is essentially aﬀected by their
beliefs on the behavior of others. We now extend our simple model to encompass
such a situation.
First, we diﬀerentiate between agents who have a ﬁrm disposition and others
14who don’t. A fraction η of all agents — called the steadfast agents — is assumed
to have already adopted a norm as those considered in the previous section.
For them it is clear from the beginning that they have a reliable or unreliable
disposition. As before, the reliable agents among the steadfast have a utility
function, such that they suﬀer an inﬁnite utility loss if they fail to choose ˆ e
once having signed the contract whereas an unreliable agent’s utility function is
independent of ˆ e.
The other fraction 1 − η of agents, however, has not “made up their mind”
which norm to follow. We assume that those agents — we will call them con-
formists — will be reliable, if and only if they believe that the fraction of reliable
agents among those who have a ﬁrm disposition is suﬃciently large. Note that
the process of adopting a norm by the conformists is therefore no conscious ra-
tional decision. Hence, we depart from a standard game theoretic framework and
assume that the agent’s preferences are aﬀected by their beliefs on the preferences
o fo t h e r s .T h e r e f o r et h eg a m ew ea n a l y z ei si nav e r ys i m p l ew a yapsychological
game in the sense of Geanakoplos et al. (1989), where a player’s payoﬀ does not
only depend on what he and others do but also on what he and others think.
Our intention is simply to capture the idea that some people tend to stick
to their word if they think that others also keep their promises but fail to do
so, if they think that most others do not stick to promises either. Again, the
agents type is denoted by θ. Now, an agent can be of three diﬀerent types. First,
there are steadfast agents who already adhere to a norm and are always reliable
(θ = θR) then there are those who are steadfast but unreliable (θ = θU)a n d
ﬁnally there are conformists (θ = θC).
But people are typically not perfectly informed about the moral principles of
others and there is uncertainty on the predominant social norm. We therefore
assume, that the fraction of reliable agents is only imperfectly known to principal
as well as agents. Both, the principal and all agents are assumed to share a
common prior belief on the fraction of reliable agents among the steadfast denoted
by τ, which is drawn from some prior distribution.
But, typically an employer will have more information on the reliability and
work habits of his employees than for instance an agent who is new to a particular
ﬁrm or organization from past experience with other employees. To capture this
idea, we suppose that before making a contract oﬀer to the agent the principal
15receives an additional signal s ∈ {L,H} on the fraction of reliable agents among
the steadfast. We denote by
τs =P r{Agent reliable|Agent steadfast, Signal s} = E [τ|s]
the conditional expectation on τ given signal s. A signal s = L indicates a low
fraction of reliable agents and a signal H a high fraction. Hence, we assume that
τH >τ L. This signal is not observed by the agent.
It remains to describe under which conditions a conformist turns out to be
reliable or unreliable. In this respect, we assume that an agent who has not yet
adopted a norm will behave reliably if he believes that τ is higher than a given
cut-oﬀ value ¯ τ in expected terms.
The timing of the extended model is as follows:
12345
-
Nature Agent learns Principal Agent can Agent
determines τ type θ; Prin- proposes accept or chooses
and agent’s cipal learns contract reject eﬀort e
type θ signal s (ˆ e,α,β) d ∈{y,n}
Hence, after the fraction τ of reliable agents is determined, the type of the
agent is chosen. With probability ητ the agent is always reliable, with probability
η(1 − τ) he is always unreliable and with probability 1 − η he is a conformist.
T h ea g e n tl e a r n sh i st y p ea n dt h ep r i n c i p al receives a signal on the fraction of
reliable agents. After that, the principal makes a contract oﬀer to the agent. The
agent then updates his beliefs on the fraction of reliable agents and decides on
whether to accept the contract (d = y) or reject it. After that the agent chooses
the eﬀort level. If he is either reliable right away or a “conformist converted to
reliability” he will always choose ˆ e if he signed the contract. Finally, the output
x is realized as above and the agent receives a wage payment as speciﬁed in the
contract.
164.1 Motivation Crowding-Out
The principal has superior information on the fraction of reliable agents in the
population when making the contract oﬀer. We might thus expect that her
contract choice is inﬂuenced by this information. As we have seen in the preceding
section, she tends to choose a higher powered incentive scheme if the fraction of
reliable agents is small. On the other hand, it is attractive to choose a ﬁxed wage
i ft h ef r a c t i o no fr e l i a b l ea g e n t si sl a r g e .
But of course, the choice of the wage scheme conveys information to the agent
receiving the oﬀer. As the principal has superior information, the contract choice
will strongly inﬂuence the agent’s beliefs on the prevalent norm. Suppose that the
principal indeed makes diﬀerent contract oﬀers depending on her signal about the
fraction of reliable agents. In that case, a conformist can learn from being oﬀered
a higher powered incentive scheme that the principal thinks that not sticking to
promises is a widespread and therefore ”acceptable” demeanor. But this may lead
ac o n f o r m i s tt ob e c o m eu n r e l i a b l ea sh em a yb el e a dt oc h o o s eo n l yt h ei n c e n t i v e
compatible eﬀort level instead of the higher performance objective agreed on in
the contract.
From these considerations it becomes evident that choosing higher powered
incentives may in principle have two eﬀects on the agent’s motivation:
• Aw e l lk n o w nincentive eﬀect: Unreliable agents have higher incentives to
exert eﬀort simply by striving to maximize their material payoﬀ.
• Amotivation crowding-out eﬀect:O ﬀering higher powered incentive schemes
signals that not sticking to an unveriﬁable performance objective is a wide-
spread and hence acceptable behavior and this makes conformists to become
unreliable.
The game described above is a signalling game. Of course, a rational principal
will anticipate both the incentive as well as the crowding-out eﬀect. It is there-
fore interesting to analyze whether crowding-out may indeed take place in equi-
librium. We seek for Perfect Bayesian Equilibria in pure strategies of this game,
which consist of: the principal’s strategy as a contract oﬀer Cs =( ˆ es,α s,βs) for
each information set s ∈ {L,H}, an agent’s strategy consisting of an acceptance
decision d(C,θ) and eﬀort choice e(C,θ) for each contract oﬀer C and typeθ
17and ﬁnally, an agent’s beliefs Pr{s = H|C,θ} on the principal’s signal for each
contract oﬀer C and type θ.
We start by analyzing how a conformist’s reliability is determined, given his
beliefs on the principal’s signal on the equilibrium path. If the principal’s private
information on the norm is not revealed, the agent’s beliefs are unaﬀected. Hence,
a conformist will a priori be reliable if and only if the agents’ prior beliefs are
such that E [τ] ≥ ¯ τ.
If, however, the agent learns the principal’s information, this signal may only
have an impact on the agent’s reliability if τH > ¯ τ>τ L.T h e r e f o r ew ei m p o s e
this condition as an assumption as otherwise the conformists will either always
be reliable or unreliable, in which case the analysis of section 3 applies:
Assumption 1: τH > ¯ τ>τ L.
A conformist will then be reliable if he learns that the principal received a
high signal and unreliable if he learns that it has been a low signal.
The principal’s contract choice will of course depend on her beliefs about the
agent’s reliability given her information and the agent’s behavior. Her interim
b e l i e ft h a tt h ea g e n ti sr e l i a b l ei sd e t e r m i n e da sf o l l o w s :
(1 − η)Pr{Conformist is reliable} + ηE[τ|s].
We denote the overall probability that the principal meets a reliable agent if all
conformists are reliable (R) and she received a signal that the fraction of reliable
agents is high (H)b yφRH, where
φRH =( 1− η)+ητH.
If however, the principal received a low signal and this is learned by the agent
any conformist will be unreliable and the overall probability of contracting with
a reliable agent is16
φUL = ητL.
Recall that a cut-oﬀ level ˆ φ was deﬁned in Proposition 3, such that it is in
16Similarly we deﬁne φUH = ητH and φRL =( 1− η)+ητL.
18the principal’s best interest to choose a ﬁxed wage contract if and only if the
probability of contracting with a reliable agent is larger than this cut-oﬀ.W en o w
impose the assumption that the principal prefers to choose a ﬁxed wage contract
when all agents are steadfast and the signal indicates that a high fraction of
them is reliable. On the other hand, we suppose that she would rather choose an
incentive contract when again all are steadfast but only a low fraction is reliable:
Assumption 2: τH > ˆ φ>τ L.
In particular, this assumption implies that φRH > ˆ φ>φ UL for all values of η.17
Hence, the principal always prefers a ﬁxed wage contract when all conformists and
a high fraction of the steadfast agents are reliable but rather chooses an incentive
contract if the conformists are unreliable and only a low fraction of steadfast
is reliable. Assumptions 1 and 2 assure that potentially ﬁxed wages as well as
incentive schemes can in principle be optimal when the principal’s information is
revealed.
4.2 Equilibrium Analysis
Now we can analyze, whether motivation crowding-out may indeed take place
in equilibrium. Note that the principal may for instance have an interest not to
choose a high powered incentive scheme when her signal is low but to stick to the
same contract she would oﬀer after the high signal. By this she might be able to
prevent the crowding-out eﬀect among the conformists, even if incentives for the
steadfastly unreliable agents are forgone. If this is the case, a pooling equilibrium
arises in which the principal oﬀers the same contract independent of her signal.
4.2.1 Pooling Equilibria: Preventing Motivation Crowding-Out
However, a precondition for the existence of a pooling equilibrium is that the
conformists are reliable a priori in the sense that they initially believe that stick-
ing to an agreement is the prevailing norm (E [τ] ≥ ¯ τ). To see this, just suppose
the contrary holds and the conformists a priori believe that less than a fraction ¯ τ
of the steadfast stick to a norm in expected terms. In that case, any conformist
17To see that, note that these inequalities always hold if η =1as then they correspond to
the assumption. Furthermore, φRH is decreasing and φUL increasing in η.
19will behave unreliably when no further information is revealed. As in a pool-
ing equilibrium no information is revealed, any conformist will be unreliable in
equilibrium. But then motivation crowding-out cannot take place if the princi-
pal deviates from the pooling contract, as the motivation to stick to agreements
is already absent among the conformists. The principal is then best oﬀ when
choosing the optimal contract given her signal. As we have seen in the previous
section she will optimally propose diﬀerent contracts in both states and this in
turn will reveal her information.
However, when the conformists are reliable a-priori then pooling equilibria
can arise as the following result shows:18
Proposition 4 (i) If E [τ] < ¯ τ there is no pooling equilibrium. (ii) If E [τ] ≥ ¯ τ
a pooling equilibrium exists in which a ﬁxed wage contract is oﬀered regardless
of the principal’s signal if and only if this contract CP =( ˆ eP,α P,0) satisﬁes the
following conditions
αP ≤ φRHˆ eP − π(C
∗ (φUH)|φUH), (4)








(iii) The set of ﬁxed wage pooling equilibria is non-empty if and only if the fraction
of steadfast agents η is smaller than a cut-oﬀ level.
Proof: See Appendix.
Note that if any pooling equilibrium can be sustained, then it can also be sus-
tained with out-of-equilibrium beliefs such that the agent thinks that the principal
received a low signal after any deviation from the equilibrium path. In that case,
any deviation will lead the conformists to become unreliable and — as we have
seen in Proposition 3 — the principal is worse oﬀ with a higher fraction of unreli-
able agents. A ﬁxed wage pooling equilibrium in which a contract CP is oﬀered
exists if the principal has no incentive to deviate from CP whatever her signal.
After having received the high signal, the highest possible expected payoﬀ she
18Recall the notation from the previous section: π(C|φ) is the principal’s expected proﬁt
from a contract C if the fraction of reliable agents is φ. C∗ (φ) is the optimal contract when
the fraction of reliable agents is φ.
20can receive when all conformists are unreliable is π (C∗ (φUH)|φUH) as given by
Proposition 3. Condition (4) guarantees that the principal is better oﬀ with CP
in that case. Condition (5) does the same for the case of a low signal. Finally,
condition (6) is the agent’s participation constraint.
A pooling equilibrium with a pure ﬁxed wage exists if a contract CP satisﬁes
all three conditions. As Proposition 4 has shown this will be the case if and only
if the prior is such that all conformists are initially reliable and the fraction of
conformists is large enough.
To understand this on an intuitive level, it is important to note that the reason
why the principal sticks to the pooling contract in equilibrium is that she wants
to prevent motivation crowding-out. If, for instance, she has received a signal
indicating a low proportion of reliable agents and therefore proposes an incentive
contract this will lead the conformists to become unreliable. If the fraction of
conformists is large (i.e. η is small), this eﬀect will be of high importance as
the probability that the agent’s behavior is aﬀected is large. In addition, the
proportion of steadfast agents is small and, as a consequence, there are also only
a few steadfastly unreliable agents who are positively aﬀected by incentives. The
motivation crowding-out eﬀect may therefore outweigh the incentive eﬀect.
If however, the number of conformists is relatively small and therefore the
number of steadfast agents large, the crowding-out eﬀect will be less important.
In that case, it is more important to ﬁne tune the incentive scheme according
to the signal and the principal has to worry less about the reduction of work
ethics. A pooling equilibrium will therefore never occur if there are only a few
conformists or — putting it diﬀerently — if the uncertainty on the behavioral norm
is small.
Figure 2 shows possible ﬁxed wage pooling contracts for an example.19 The
requested eﬀort levels ˆ e are plotted on the abscissa, the wages α on the ordinate
axis. The upper ascending line is the upper boundary of the half-plane deﬁned by
(4): Oﬀering a ﬁxed wage above this line would not be attractive for a principal
having received a high signal. Wages are so high that she would be better oﬀ by
oﬀering a diﬀerent contract even if the conformists get unreliable. Similarly, the
lower ascending line is the upper boundary of the half-plane (5).The set of ﬁxed
wage contracts sustainable in a pooling equilibrium is in the darkly shaded area
19The parameter values are c =1 .1, k =0 .3, η =0 .5, τL =0 .9, τS =0 .3, r =0 .2 and σ =1 .
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Figure 2: Equilibrium ﬁxed wage oﬀers
below these two boundaries where both constraints are met and above the cost
function.
4.2.2 Separating Equilibria
It is now of course interesting whether separating equilibria exist. Note that the
principal’s contract oﬀer then reveals her private information on the prevailing
norm. She oﬀers a diﬀerent contract when she thinks that the fraction of reliable
agents among the steadfast is high than when it is low. This of course has the
direct consequences for the conformists’ moral disposition laid out above. Hence,
in any separating equilibrium motivation crowding-out will indeed take place.
We focus on those equilibria in which the principal oﬀers a ﬁxed wage contract
after having observed a signal indicating a high fraction of reliable agents. Indeed,
we can show that such separating equilibria always exist:
Proposition 5 There is a set of separating equilibria with the following proper-
ties: (i)The principal proposes the incentive contract CL = C∗ (φUL) after having
observed the low signal s = L. (ii) The principal oﬀers a ﬁxed wage contract
22CH =( ˆ eH,α H,0) after having observed the high signal. This contract must have
the following properties:
αH ≤ φRHˆ eH − π(C
∗ (φUH)|φUH), (7)








(iii) This set is always non-empty.
Proof: See Appendix.
A separating equilibrium consists of two contracts. The contract CL is oﬀered
after the principal received the low signal and CH after the high signal. On the
one hand, if a separating equilibrium exists, neither the principal should have
an incentive to pretend having received the high signal (by oﬀering CH)w h e n
she received the low signal nor vice versa. But in addition, in both cases the
principal should have no interest to deviate to a contract diﬀerent from CL and
CH. If any separating equilibrium can be sustained, then there will be one where
agents believe that the principal received the low signal after any deviation from
the equilibrium path. It can be straightforwardly seen that only C∗ (φUL) can be
chosen after the low signal in a separating equilibrium: When choosing CL the
principal reveals that she received the low signal. Any deviation (except that to
CH) will also make them think that she received the low signal. But C∗ (φUL)
i st h eb e s tc o n t r a c tc h o i c ef o rt h a tc a s e . S t i l l ,w eh a v et og u a r a n t e et h a tt h e
principal has no incentive to deviate and choose CH after the low signal which
will make the agents think that she believes in a high fraction of reliable agents.
B u tt h i si se n s u r e db yc o n d i t i o n( 8 ) .
When the principal received the high signal, any deviation from CH will lead
the conformists to become unreliable (including of course a deviation to CL). The
best possible deviation is to choose C∗ (φUH). Hence, for a ﬁxed wage contract CH
to be part of an equilibrium the principal must be better oﬀ with CH in the case
where all conformists are reliable than with C∗ (φUH) with unreliable conformists.
This condition is equivalent to condition (7). In addition, the contract CH must
satisfy the participation constraint (9). As we have shown, there are always
ﬁxed wage contracts CH that satisfy those constraints and therefore the set of
23separating equilibria is always non-empty.
The possible ﬁxed wage contracts oﬀered in the separating equilibrium after
a high signal are also illustrated in ﬁgure 2 in the lightly shaded area. Note that
the boundaries coincide with those given for the pooling equilibrum with ﬁxed
wages. But here, the lower ascending line is the lower boundary of the half-plane
(8): Contracts below this line would be imitated by a principal having received
a low signal and therefore cannot be part of a separating equilibrium (this was a
precondition for such a contract to be part of a pooling equilibrium). The upper
ascending line is again the upper boundary of the half-plane (7): Oﬀering a ﬁxed
wage above this line would not be attractive for a principal having received a
high signal. Wages are so high that she would be better oﬀ by oﬀering a diﬀerent
contract even if the conformists get unreliable.
Figure 3 shows another example where there are less conformists in the pop-
ulation.20 The ﬁxed wage contracts in the lightly shaded area satisfy both con-
straints (8) and (7) as well as the participation constraint. Therefore, separating
equilibria exist in which such contracts are oﬀered by the principal after she re-
ceived a high signal. However, the lower boundary for (8) which coincides with
the upper boundary for (5) in the pooling case is here always below the cost
function. Any ﬁxed wage contract satisfying the participation constraint is worse
for a principal with a low signal than her optimal incentive contract. Hence, ﬁxed
wage pooling equilibria cannot exist.
When the principal received a signal indicating that the fraction of reliable
a g e n t si nt h ep o p u l a t i o ni ss m a l l ,s h ew i l lo ﬀer an incentive contract in such a
separating equilibrium. By doing this she reveals the information that a large part
of the population is not sticking to agreements. But this leads to a “contagion”
of the conformists with this “unreliable” norm. The conformists exert only the
incentive compatible eﬀort instead of the higher performance commitment ˆ e.
Hence, it can indeed be the case as Kreps has informally pointed out that the
introduction of high powered incentives might lead to a muddied relationship
between employer and employee in the sense that the employee “is sent signals
that the relationship is a market exchange and reacts accordingly taking fuller
advantages of opportunities presented to him” (Kreps (1997), p. 363).
The principal will nonetheless choose the incentive contract in this equilibrium
20The ﬁgure is plotted for the same parameter values as ﬁgure 2 with the only diﬀerence that
the fraction of steadfast agents η is 0.87 instead of 0.5.
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Figure 3: No ﬁxed wage pooling equilibria
as here the choice of a ﬁxed wage contract is not attractive: Although this would
lead the conformists to behave reliably she is still better oﬀ in expected terms
when choosing an incentive contract when her signal indicates a high fraction of
unreliable agents among the steadfast.
It is important to note that situations will arise in which the principal due
to a misleading signal chooses an incentive contract but would have been better
oﬀ with a ﬁxed wage contract. Consider for instance the extreme case where
all steadfast agents are either reliable or unreliable and the principal’s signal
gives an indication which of the two cases holds but this signal is wrong with
a given probability smaller than a half. Furthermore, assume that the prior
belief is such that the conformists are initially reliable. When now the principal
mistakenly receives the low signal although in truth the steadfast agents are all
reliable, she proposes an incentive scheme. She will then be worse oﬀ with this
decision for two reasons:21 On the one hand, she provides costly incentives for the
steadfast agents although they would have worked hard with mere ﬁxed wages.
But in addition, the conformists motivation to stick to agreements is crowded
21Still, of course this decision will be optimal given her information.
25out. Hence, if the management of a ﬁrm underestimated the work ethics of its
employees and therefore introduces an incentive scheme it may indeed turn out
that overall performance is actually reduced.
5C o n c l u s i o n
The sociologist Max Weber introduced a distinction among instrumental ratio-
nality (“Zweckrationalität”) and value rationality (“Wertrationalität”) when de-
scribing the determinants of social behavior. Individuals behave instrumentally
rational when they choose an action to achieve some goal or end. But their
behavior may also be determined by value rationality that is by „the conscious
belief in the unconditional [..] value of a certain form of behavior purely for its
own sake and independent of its success”22. Contract theoretical models typ-
ically assume purely instrumentally rational behavior: Agents do not stick to
agreements specifying unveriﬁable actions as their preferences are unaﬀected by
the agreement itself but only by the consequences of their actions.
However, some people attach an inherent value to the fulﬁllment of a promise
and are therefore driven by value rationality in this respect. As we have seen, such
behavior can be analyzed with standard utility theory simply by imposing that
such an agent incurs a huge utility loss when breaking promises. It has turned
out that optimal incentive contracts are lower powered than those analyzed in
standard hidden action models as long as there is a positive probability that an
agent is reliable.
But the value rationality of people might be inﬂuenced by social norms, i.e.
their beliefs on the value others attach to certain actions, namely in our context
to the question on whether to stick to unveriﬁable agreements. As we have seen,
incentive contracts then aﬀect the preferences of people as the introduction of a
costly incentive scheme signals that not sticking to agreements is a widespread
and therefore acceptable behavior. This leads to motivation crowding-out among
those agents whose behavior is indeed aﬀected by social norms. Instead of a
higher agreed (and “potentially value rational”) eﬀort level they choose only a
lower, incentive compatible (“instrumentally rational”) level. If the principal for
instance mistakenly thinks that the fraction of agents having ﬁrm preferences
22Compare Weber (1956), p. 17, translation by the author.
26for the fulﬁllment of agreements is small, a situation may arise in which she is
actually worse oﬀ when proposing an incentive scheme as compared to a pure
ﬁxed wage.
On a more general level, our theory is therefore in line with experimental
evidence found by Gneezy and Rustichini (2000b) who compared the eﬀect of
diﬀerent payment schemes on the performance of children when collecting for a
charity. The amount collected by those groups who received a commission rose
with the height of the commission. Hence, the incentive eﬀect is present and
works well in line with standard contract theory. But the highest amounts were
collected by the groups who did not receive any commission at all. It therefore
seems that the fact that a commission was paid shifted the reason why the children
collected the money. Whereas they might have felt committed to collect as much
money as possible without monetary incentives, the introduction of a commission
per se may have led them to orientate their actions towards a more “incentive
compatible” eﬀort level.
These theoretical considerations have of course some important practical im-
plications. As we have seen, already in our simple model a multiplicity of equilib-
ria arises if the proportion of conformists is suﬃciently large. This may give some
hints explaining the diversity of successful human resource management policies
in practice. On the one hand, there are prosperous ﬁrms, as has for instance
been stressed by Baron and Kreps (1999)23, that have established a corporate
culture largely based on commitments without strong individual performance in-
centives. But other ﬁrms work with high powered individual incentive schemes
and may be successful as well with a “pay-for-performance” culture, in which
employees expect direct monetary rewards for higher performance and receive
those rewards. Both types of corporate culture can be stable situations and may
arise as equilibrium outcomes.
But the mechanisms described indicate a certain danger of “playing around”
with incentive schemes. A ﬁrm may for instance consider the implementation of
an incentive scheme and may therefore want to test the scheme for a trial period
and abandon it if it does not bring about the expected beneﬁts. But the danger
of a possibly transitory introduction of monetary incentives is that the system of
social norms may be shifted away from a commitment based culture to a culture
23See for instance the discussion and examples in Chapters 3 and 11.
27where agents expect direct rewards. Such a shift in culture may be persistent as
t h ef r a c t i o no fa g e n t ss t i c k i n gt ot h e i rp e r f o r m a n c ec o m m i t m e n tm a yb er e d u c e d
and may stay at the lower level even after the incentive scheme is abandoned
again. Such an eﬀect has indeed been empirically observed again by Gneezy and
Rustichini (2000a), where the impact of a ﬁne imposed on parents for coming
late when picking up their children from a day-care center had been examined.
It was not only the case that the introduction of the ﬁne increased the number of
late coming parents, but even after the ﬁnal cancellation of the ﬁne, the number
of late comers remained at a higher level than before the introduction.
Furthermore, our model indicates that the introduction of an incentive system
can have a very diverse impact on individual behavior. It will unambiguously
raise the eﬀort of those employees who do not feel obliged to stick to performance
commitments from the beginning. However, it may well lower the motivation of
employees who previously felt bound to those commitments. The latter employees
may learn that such a commitment is mere “cheap talk” and therefore orientate
their eﬀorts towards a lower level which is optimal from the perspective of their
material self-interest.
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2 − k. (10)
The optimum is characterized by the following two ﬁrst order conditions :
(1 − β)φ + β − cˆ e =0 , (11)
−φˆ e +( 1− φ)
1
c
(1 − 2β)+ˆ e − rσ
2β =0 . (12)
28For a given β the performance commitment ˆ e is obtained from equation (11):
ˆ e =
β +( 1− β)φ
c
(13)
Note that this yields that ˆ e>e= β/c. By inserting this expression for ˆ e into





2 + crσ2. (14)

























The ﬁxed wage α can then be computed by solving the binding participation
constraint (1) for α:

















P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 :















When she instead chooses the optimal incentive contract, we can compute proﬁts
by inserting the expression for ˆ e as a function of β given by (13) into principal’s
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from where it can be directly seen that π(C∗
V (φ)|φ) is increasing in φ.T h e























which is the case if either
φ
2 < 1 − kc−
p
(2rσ2 + k)kc2 or
φ





(2rσ2 + k)kc2 >k cthe second term is larger than one. Hence, the variable
wage will be chosen if
φ
2 < 1 − kc−
p
(2rσ2 + k)kc2.
If the right hand side is positive the cut-oﬀ ˆ φ is given by its root, otherwise ˆ φ =0
and an incentive scheme will never be optimal in that case.
30P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 :
(i) If E [τ] < ¯ τ all conformists are unreliable if they receive no further information.
Suppose a pooling equilibrium exists with a contract CP. It is easiest to sustain
such an equilibrium if the agent believes that the signal is bad whenever the
principal deviates from this equilibrium. In that case, when receiving the high
signal the principal optimally chooses C∗ (φUH) where φUH = ητH. Hence, we
must have that CP = C∗ (φUH). But when receiving the low signal, she is better
oﬀ by choosing the contract C∗ (φUL). We know from Section 3 that for diﬀerent
values of φ,d i ﬀerent contracts will be optimal. Hence, C∗ (φUH) 6= C∗ (φUL) and
we cannot have a pooling equilibrium with an unreliable prior.
(ii) Take any ﬁxed wage pooling contract (ˆ eP,α P,0). Again, such an equilibrium
is easiest to sustain if the agent believes that the signal is bad (and hence, con-
formists are unreliable) whenever the principal deviates from this contract. To see
t h i s ,j u s tn o t et h a tw eh a v et oc o n s i d e ro n l yd e v i a t i o n st h a ta r eo p t i m a lf o rg i v e n
beliefs and therefore given probability φ of contracting with a reliable agent. But
from Proposition 3 we know that the principal’s proﬁt from an optimal contract
is always increasing in the fraction of reliable agents.
After s = H the most attractive deviation is to choose C∗ (φUH). Hence, we
must have that
φRHˆ eP − αP ≥ π(C
∗ (φUH)|φUH). (15)
After observing s = L the most attractive deviation is to oﬀer C∗ (φUL) yielding
the necessary condition
φRLˆ eP − αP ≥ π(C
∗ (φUL)|φUL). (16)
Furthermore, for (ˆ eP,α P,0) to be chosen in equilibrium, it must satisfy the par-
ticipation constraint αP ≥ c
2ˆ e2
P.
(iii) We still have to check, whether this set of possible ﬁxed wage pooling con-
tracts is non-empty. We will ﬁrst show, that this is not the case if η is large.
A necessary (but not suﬃcient) condition for a pooling equilibrium to exist is
that the boundary deﬁned by (16) intersects the cost function: Otherwise, con-
tracts satisfying the condition will never fulﬁll the participation constraint as the
boundary is always below the cost function. If an intersection exists, there must
be some value of ˆ e such that c





























2c <π(C∗ (φUL)|φUL) by As-
sumption 2. Hence, there can be no pooling equilibrium if η =1 . On the other
hand, when all are conformists (η =0 )w eh a v et h a tφRH = φRL =1 .T h e
contract C∗ (1) attains the ﬁrst-best proﬁta n ds a t i s ﬁes both conditions (15) and
(16). Hence, a pooling equilibrium always exists if η =0 .24 The proof is now
completed by showing that if there is a ﬁxed wage pooling contract satisfying
(15), (16) and the participation constraint for some value of η,t h e r ew i l lb ea l s o
s u c hap o o l i n gc o n t r a c tf o ra l lη0 <η . To see that take some vector (αP, ˆ eP)
satisfying the conditions for some η. For smaller values of η the left hand side
of both conditions (15), (16) are larger as φRH and φRL are both decreasing in
η. But the right hand sides are smaller as π(C∗ (φ)|φ) is increasing in φ by
Proposition 3 and φUH and φUL are both increasing in η. Hence, the pooling set
is larger, the smaller η and a cut-oﬀ value for η must exist such that the set is
non-empty whenever η is smaller than this cut-oﬀ.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5 :
(i) In a separating equilibrium the agent is informed about the principal’s signal.
Hence, after learning that the principal received a low signal, a conformist will
always be unreliable and the overall probability of contracting with a reliable
agent is φUL = ητL. Any contract choice is then dominated by C∗ (φUL), which
is the full information optimal contract for this case. By Assumption 2 and
Proposition 3 this will be an incentive contract.
(ii) In a separating equilibrium the agent infers that the principal received the
high signal when she oﬀers CH. Hence, a conformist will always be reliable in
24Note that by the continuity of π(C∗ (φUL)|φUL) in η pooling equilibria do not exist in the
neighbourhood of η =1 . Similarly, for η =0the inequalities (15) and (16) are strict. As all
functions are continuous, pooling equilibria always exist in the neighbourhood of η =0 .
32that case. If the principal has received the high signal she therefore expects a
proﬁto f
φRHˆ eH − αH
when oﬀering the ﬁxed wage contract CH. Again, if any separating equilibrium
can be sustained, then one can be sustained in which the agent believes that the
principal received a low signal after any deviation from the equilibrium path. The
best deviation for the principal when s = H is to choose the optimal contract for
this case, which is C∗ (φUH). Hence, the principal does not want to deviate after
s = H if condition (7) holds.
After observing the low signal the principal expects an equilibrium proﬁto f
π(C∗ (φUL)|φUL) as all conformists are unreliable in that case. Note that the
only tempting deviation is to imitate the high signal by choosing CH:A n yo t h e r
deviation will lead the conformists to become unreliable and CL is already the
optimal contract for that case. But with deviation to CH motivation crowding-
out will be prevented and the conformists will become reliable. In that case, the
principal’s expected proﬁts are φRLˆ eH − αH. She will not have an incentive to
deviate to CH if condition (8) holds. Condition (9) is again the participation
constraint assuring that the reliable agent’s best response to a contract oﬀer CH
is to accept.
(iii) Finally, we have to show that this set of separating equilibria is always non-
empty. It will be shown that there is always at least one vector (α,e) satisfying






































25For ease of notation let π∗
UH = π(C∗ (φUH)|φUH) and π∗
UL = π(C∗ (φUL)|φUL).













UH. We have to check, whether this contract is above the lower bound, which is
the case if it is to the right of the intersection of both incentive constraints. The
intersection of both constraints is given by
φRHˆ e − π
∗
UH = φRLˆ e − π
∗









































It suﬃces to show that





Note that C∗ (φUH) can either be a ﬁx e dw a g eo ra ni n c e n t i v ec o n t r a c t .









2c it suﬃces to show that








⇔ 2(1− η + ητH) ≥ η(τH + τL)
⇔ 2 − 2η + η(τH − τL) ≥ 0
which is always the case.
b) When C∗ (φUH) is an incentive contract we consider the right hand side of


















H + crσ2) − (1 − η2τ2
L + crσ2)(1− η2τ2
H)
2(1− η2τ2


















Note that this expression is strictly increasing in r. The more risk averse the
agent, the larger is the impact of the diﬀerence in the probability of contracting











constitutes an upper bound on the right hand side of inequality (17). From part
( a )w ek n o wt h a tt h e r e f o r e( 1 7 )i sa l w a y sm e t .
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